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Europe, Laboratory for A-Democracy? 
Robert Salais ∗ 
Abstract: »Europa, Laboratorium für A-Demokratie?«. A-democracy is for a giv-
en society a state in which, like the apples sold in supermarkets, democracy has 
now only the appearance of democracy, without the taste (no real practice and 
effectivity) that should go along with it. This contribution claims that, for the 
leaders of the neoliberal global market and finance, the searched political solu-
tion for its crisis is how to change everything without changing anything. The 
construction of Europe appears a de facto laboratory for experiments aimed at 
this objective. For the European Union is using in different fields forms of de-
mocracy whose specificity is to imply participants (peoples, actors, organiza-
tions, national political elites) in a game in which they control neither the rules, 
nor the data, the agendas, or the outcomes. The contribution reviews a series of 
these forms; which describe passages to a-democracy in the current crisis. 
Keywords: Democracy, European Union, market order, neoliberalism, law, gov-
ernance. 
1.  Introduction 
Many economists (and, generally speaking, many European people) are sur-
prised that so little is done, in any case too little, to achieve an in-depth trans-
formation of the rules of the global market and finance, and to truly lift the 
world out of the economic and financial crisis. In fact, the proponents of the 
world market order seek another outcome altogether, an outcome that, is above 
all, political. To paraphrase the Leopard in the book by Giuseppe Tomasi di 
Lampedusa (di Lampedusa 1960), what is the way to change everything with-
out changing anything? My conjecture, issued from my book, Le viol d’Europe. 
Enquête sur la disparition d’une idée, is that the European construction consti-
tutes a de facto laboratory for testing some of the political solutions searched 
for the survival of the global order. The main stake is how to control the wishes 
of individuals and peoples who aspire to another future, one to their liking. 
How to continue to durably involve them into the current situation and, at the 
same time, not to leave way to their aspirations?  
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This is where the construction of Europe comes into play. The European 
Union, or rather those at its head, is innovative in that it uses the forms of de-
mocracy (and even creates new ones) to attain this goal of survival, even as these 
forms are in practice gutted of their content, their dynamics, and all democratic 
practice. In the following discussion I call this the passage to a-democracy. Like 
the superb apples sold in supermarkets, democracy has now only the appear-
ance of democracy, without the taste that should go along with it.1 
2.  The Construction of Europe: Laboratory of A-
Democracy? 
I prefer the concept of a-democracy to the one of post-democracy suggested by 
some authors, in particular, Wolgang Streeck (2013a). Post-democracy seems to 
me both premature and, ultimately, inadequate. Because the partisans of the 
current world order have not endorsed the divorce between capitalism and de-
mocracy, and the consequent abandon of democracy which, according Streeck, 
would already be the case. In my view, the still dominant orientation is to main-
tain the institutional and procedural forms of democracy, while at the same time 
trying to control their content and to weaken their democratic effectiveness. I 
will present below several examples of this. Post-democracy, if it is to occur, 
would be for me a step further in the process. It will be marked by true attacks, 
though still localized, against fundamental freedoms and rights.  
What if then the European process were a full-scale laboratory to test the effi-
cacy of political forms suitable to stabilize and legitimize the survival of contem-
porary capitalism? One should note that it could also be a laboratory allowing 
researchers to scrutinize the contradictions within the process, and eventually the 
emergence of new possibilities and leverage points to implement them. 
In fact, the European process has gotten a head start in this quest for innova-
tive political forms. As I have shown in my book, Le viol d’Europe. Enquête 
sur la disparition d’une idée (Salais 2013), the construction of Europe is large-
ly the product of the setting-up of the world market order desired by the victo-
rious countries in the immediate postwar period. The institution of this order 
was driven by the United States, starting with the Bretton Woods agreement in 
1944, and the creation of the IMF, GATT, and NATO. The European process 
cannot be reduced to this impulsion of course; it has its own original features 
and its resistances to the American project for Europe, if only through its own 
history and specific politics – the role of Nation States, for example. Despite 
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the fact that the Grand Narrative disseminated by European authorities ignores 
it, the period of the origins, 1944 to 1956, is decisive. The Marshall Plan and 
ECA, its management and oversight agency in Europe, the IMF, GATT, 
OEEC, and NATO, were the loci where the rules guiding and structuring the 
negotiation process between European national leaders were born.2 The Europe 
of Six in 1957 was what remained of much more ambitious projects, and it bore 
the traces of them.  
Two of these features make the European process an exemplary subject for 
contemporary quest aimed at finding political forms adapted to today’s crisis. 
Indeed, they make it a unique object, an Unidentified Political Object, a UPO 
in the contemporary world. 
The first of these features is that as early as the 1950s Europe retracted into 
a market constructivism: initially the Common Market, and then from the 
1980s the Single Market and the liberalization of movements of capital. Europe 
undertook the construction of a perfect market according to two types of rules: 
the rules of law on one hand – focusing on the elimination of restraints on the 
free circulation of goods, services, capital and, secondarily, persons – and, on 
the other hand, from the beginning of the 2000s, the transposition of the pri-
vate-sector rules of management by quantitative performance into the defini-
tion and monitoring of European policy. One could call this second type of 
rules, the rules of governing by numbers. 
Very early on, the edification of European institutions, in the economic and 
financial domains in particular, carried in its breast the premises of today’s 
neoliberal credo, without this being intentional. This meant that European 
leaders had to start looking for new political forms in the 1990s, long before 
today’s crisis: forms that would meet the political needs of neoliberalism, while 
suiting the specific characteristics of European institutions. 
The other feature is that, in retrospect by a “happy” paradox, the choice of 
non-recourse to democratic practices at the European level was made even 
before Europe officially came into being. History is not the neutral passage of 
time. It is not as if when an institution is created the actual conditions of its 
implementation are unrelated to the institutional framework that has previously 
been set up, to the practices and systems of conventional expectations that have 
taken root. There are hierarchical relationships, dominations, instrumentaliza-
tions, inversions of meaning, and survivals of the past that research in political 
economy must not only acknowledge, but also bring into the full light of inves-
tigation in order to establish their signification. This non-recourse to democrat-
ic practice, this a-democracy, was little by little integrated into an institutional 
framework, into the practices of its actors, into a purely instrumental technical 
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rationality, that today, more than 60 years of development on, puts up an im-
placable resistance to any attempt at true democratization. 
This choice was that of Jean Monnet, for one, and of the French planners for 
whom political decision making was meant to be informed by an array of tech-
nicians and engineers who were sheltered from the “impurities” of political 
deliberation, that was too rapidly equated with political wheeling and dealing. 
This option was implemented right from the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The ECSC joint assembly was, above all, a 
democratic appendix made up of national representatives delegated by their 
respective parliaments; it met once a year and had the prerogative of dismissing 
the ECSC High Authority if it could muster a two-thirds majority. In reality, 
the essential levers of power were protected.  
This choice of non-recourse to democratic practice was also the option rec-
ommended, as early as 1949, by the ECA, the American government agency 
that administered the Marshall Plan in Europe. The idea was that the construc-
tion of a united Europe provided a chance to be rid of the Nation-State model 
that was held to be responsible, at least in part, for the delusions and deviance 
of totalitarianism before the war. Moreover, this conviction was shared by a 
broad segment of the European elite, mostly of a social-democrat or progres-
sive-liberal stripe. To effectively erase the Nation States, the best path was to 
obtain acceptance of the loss of national sovereignty, and transfer its attributes 
to technical operational instances that were distanced from national States and 
political debates. It can be added that many Americans had a hard time grasp-
ing the difference between a “State” in the European sense, and a “state” of the 
United States. Lastly – and today we could say that this is odd, given the cir-
cumstances – the States, their administrative bodies and political personnel, 
accepted this perspective all the more readily (according to Alan Milward 
1992) since they saw in this structure a sort of discreet negotiating forum in 
which they could settle among themselves their differences regarding suprana-
tional problems. 
“Planism,” the interests of the United States, and the clubby negotiations be-
tween leaders thus converged to inscribe non-recourse to democratic practice at 
the very deepest level of the European political process. In the fifties, such non-
recourse to democracy could have seemed the lesser evil, in light of the urgent 
strategic need, or rather perceived as such, to build a firebreak to counter the 
Soviet Union and communism. Retrospectively, by making the need of public 
democratic debate pointless, it appears one of the political biases that favored 
the turn to the neoliberal credo of the perfect market in the 1990s. It also left 
room to the creeping seizure of power by European technocratic institutions 
which self-legitimate themselves on the basis of technical objectivity and opti-
mum performance. The growing autonomy and strength of these institutions 
when exercising power, today more and more rely on the threat of financial 
markets against Member State, and thereby to the detriment of their peoples 
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and citizens. The reason is simple: if they refuse to follow the recommenda-
tions of the ECB and the European Commission, Member States run the risk to 
see their borrowing conditions on the financial markets becoming more diffi-
cult and costly. To date, the wielders of this power have successfully main-
tained (by various techniques – allegiances, co-optation, fear, the promise of 
positions) an agreement in the center of the political field between the moderate 
right-wing and social-democrats to refrain from endangering this hold on pow-
er. But this system is maintained at a growing political cost – the massive disaf-
fection, abstention and rejection on the part of the people of Europe. 
Let us look more closely at four points in particular. 
3.  Of Several Very Useful Instruments and Substitutions 
- Financial deregulation rather than democracy, the turning-point of the 1980s 
- Social dialogue in lieu of collective bargaining 
- Governance by quantitative performance in place of democratic deliberation 
guaranteed by law 
- The use of the language of economics in politics. 
3.1  Financial Deregulation rather than Democracy, the Turning-
Point of the 1980s 
Rereading the history of the European process,3 today we understand that the 
passage to neoliberalism occurred when, in the 1980s, the pursuit of the con-
struction of Europe faced a choice between two pathways: that of democracy, 
the democratization of the European process, or that of the single currency. It 
should be noted that the second pathway is defined less by the single currency 
per se than by the direction which was adopted, following the path of full fi-
nancial deregulation, within Europe as well as in its relations with the rest of 
the world. This was a political choice, and not an economic choice, as shown in 
the book on the route towards Maastricht by Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Feath-
erstone (1999). Neoliberalism, and what is more, financial liberalism, slipped 
in through this flaw. It has taken hold little by little, by and for the political 
implementation of the single currency. This was a major turning point, one that 
was not foreordained at the beginning of the 1980s. Let us recall the facts. 
Going beyond the Grand Narrative that is perpetually being tweaked by of-
ficial history makers, history shows that the true project of Europe is the uni-
versalist vision, the original pathway: that of Resistance fighters, of culture, 
cooperation, peace, democracy, “commerce” in the 18th-century sense, com-
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merce among Europeans as well as with the peoples of the world, the effort of 
mutual comprehension (Salais 2014). Very early on, in the 1940s and the early 
1950s, this project was abandoned (although leaving a few traces in today’s 
Europe) and covered over by quite a different project: a Europe born of a mon-
grel strategic compromise between national elites, dominated by American 
strategic interests, a Europe that even this early on fell back on the market and 
the principle of competition, a little Europe that in 1956 – even if not yet 
adopted – was already in favor of free circulation of capital, contrary to the 
Bretton Woods agreement. I call this second historical narrative, which is clos-
er to the reality of the process, the disappearance of the Idea of Europe, in truth 
the universalist path, and I call it a failure. 
Pressure in favor of democracy began to mount in the 1970s (the events of 
1968 had left their mark). This is visible in the revival of the pre-1950 projects 
of a Europe of labor rights thanks to the Vredeling Directives (Salais 2013, part 
2, ch. 3); as well as in the decision to adopt universal suffrage for the elections 
to the European Parliament, and the first election held in 1979. The first true 
parliamentarians, politically legitimate unlike the European institutions, had 
grand ambitions for their role. At the instigation of the Italian MP Altiero Spi-
nelli, a group of parliamentarians drafted a European constitution that was 
centered around a Parliament with greater weight. The group had sought a 
compromise with the existing institutions, and the main difficulty, still unre-
solved, was the role of the Council of Ministers: what should be done with 
national governments in a European political system? Is it possible to have at 
once direct representation of the people via the European Parliament, and a 
brokering system (one can hardly speak of representation) via governments? 
The failure to make a clear choice in this matter has slowly but surely killed off 
democratic practice in Europe. It is not possible to hold democratic delibera-
tions to achieve the common European good on the one hand, and on the other 
pursue secret negotiations between national leaders in a game involving them 
and the Commission. In any event, the European Parliament unanimously 
adopted the Spinelli report in 1984, hoping it would be applied. In 1985, Al-
tiero Spinelli addressed a personal demand to François Mitterrand, asking him 
that France, which ensured the Chair of the European Community for the 1st 
semester of 1985, commit itself to support the implementation of the Report 
(Menéndez 2007). This was without any success.  
When Jacques Delors took the presidency of the European Commission in 
1985, he dropped the Spinelli report, which did not have the support of gov-
ernments. As recalled by his deputy and long-time friend Padoa-Schioppa 
(1998), Delors put the priority on general free circulation of capital, and on the 
Single Market. The problem was that Altiero Spinelli was not just another 
parliamentarian. He was one of the founders of the Italian movement for a 
federal Europe during the war, and while he was interned by Mussolini, con-
tributed to the Ventotene Manifesto of 1943. The rejection of his proposal was 
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heavy with meaning. Another aspect of the problem was that the single curren-
cy was not designed for the needs of the European economy, but to enable 
Europe to hold its place in the deregulation of world financial markets. The 
first concern of the Delors presidency was to draw up a directive to free up the 
movement of capital within the European Community and with the rest of the 
world, and to have it approved by the governments. Only afterwards was it 
proposed to convene a Committee, made up for the most part of the governors 
of central banks, to establish the outlines of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) based on financial deregulation.  
Furthermore, the Delors presidency did not follow up on the proposals 
aimed at democracy contained in the 1970 Werner Report. This report recom-
mended that the future European Central Bank (ECB) should be accountable to 
the European Parliament, and that a Centre for decisions regarding economic 
policy be set up at the European level, an instance that would have coordinated 
national budgetary policies. This Centre would also have been accountable to 
the European Parliament. Forty years on, we are still waiting for the European 
Union to take action on these matters. It is not the laughable, not to say ridicu-
lous, suggestion made in recent months to add a sort of elected parliament 
specific to the euro zone that would compensate for this lack of action.4  
Overall, the entire process has made financial markets the evaluators and 
monitors of national and European policy, at the expense of the democratic 
representation of the people of Europe. With EMU and the ECB firmly in hand 
and beyond the pale of any democratic institution, a few additional responsi-
bilities could of course be left to the European Parliament, without any conse-
quences affecting the control of the core of the reactor. The broader competen-
cies gained by the European Parliament since the Lisbon Treaty should not be 
ignored, but to seriously assess them they must be placed in context. 
3.2  Social Dialogue in Place of Collective Bargaining 
Jacques Delors built social Europe around the notion of social dialogue. What 
are the implications of this change in vocabulary from that of collective bar-
gaining? I am looking for research into what this shift implies regarding recog-
nition of the collective dimension of work and its role. An intuition, undoubted-
ly ordinary, is that the concept of social dialogue breaks the habitual link 
between strike action and collective agreement that is contained in the concept 
of collective bargaining. Historically in France, for example, (referring to the 
work done by Claude Didry) the legal and political legitimacy, and hence the 
enforceability of a collective agreement, is determined not only by the repre-
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sentativeness of the signatory organizations (and there has been progress on 
how to measure this representativeness, a classic question of representative 
democracy), and not only by the right to collective bargaining, but also by the 
fact that the strike that precedes the bargaining manifests the constitution of the 
collective entity and the recognition in action of its identity (Didry 2002). (On 
this latter point I would say it is a question of participative democracy where 
there is regression, not progress.) In a conflict, strike action and its resolution, 
the labor union, and the movement prove by participation that they truly repre-
sent a shared determination. Strikes, like movements in civil society, are vec-
tors in the practice of democracy. The use of strike action is more and more 
subject to control. The crisis has led to paralysis of the European social dia-
logue that was already losing momentum. 
3.3  Governance by Quantitative Performance in Place of Demo-
cratic Deliberation Guaranteed by Law 
One of the most neglected aspects of democracy is its capacity to produce – by 
contradictory debate and by collective thinking to define the common good to 
be accomplished – self-knowledge of society on which all can agree at the end 
of democratic deliberation. This is the hardest thing to achieve, but the most 
important, as John Dewey remarked in his time (Dewey 1927). For the antago-
nism that dominated at the beginning of the process is transformed into disa-
greement. In the ensuing debate, the participants come to exchange reasons and 
facts they accept as relevant. Agreement is reached on what there is to know; 
political disagreement continues over the solutions to be found, depending on 
the relative importance ascribed to one fact or another. In a truly democratic 
society, law is elaborated in such a way as to ensure (in the different branches 
of the law) spaces for deliberation and judgment via a public and contradictory 
process, but also by various procedures of information, consultation, discus-
sion, for example in labor law, that permit this quest and debate of the facts.  
This is precisely what governance by top-down management based on per-
formance indicators seeks to destroy and replace. This governance has spread 
like wildfire. It testifies to the paradoxical convergence of planners with the 
proponents of the perfect market, which is for me a characteristic trait of ne-
oliberalism. Government planning and the perfect market share the same con-
ception of the economy, reducing it to quantities and prices, the belief in the 
primacy of price competition, the elimination of everything that impedes the 
perfect functioning of the system, an absolute faith in efficiency, this being 
measured by cost reduction. Like the neoliberalism that is their descendant, 
they manifest the same mistrust of the exercise of individual and collective 
freedom, which planners consider to be of no use, and that free marketers find 
dangerous, because opportunist. And both are big consumers of quantitative 
data that appeal to planners for their supposedly incontrovertible objectivity 
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and to market proponents because they make it possible to set up competition 
by comparison of performance. Once again the construction of Europe is a 
precursor with its planification origins in the 1950s.5  
This type of governance assumes that it can eschew the phase during which 
knowledge of the common good is collectively produced, and that a political 
discussion can be imposed from the outset on the basis of information already 
elaborated by the Center and its experts. The typical example is the set of per-
formance indicators and targets to be achieved that one can find everywhere 
now, whatever the political domain. The veracity of the facts to be known 
having already been established, before any discussion, there is no need for a 
third-party mediator, that is to say of spaces and procedures allowing for the 
contradictory debate between different understandings of the real. Each partici-
pant is from the start obliged to adjust to this truth from on high.  
These indicators and performance charts that govern us are the vehicle for a 
normative formatting, embedded in their categories and methods of calculation, 
that unbeknownst to the actors, structures the deliberations in favor of a certain 
type of political solution. For example, the employment rate, a key variable of 
EU economic governance, and one which the States’ economic policies must 
maximize, is oriented towards deregulation of the labor market, a bias that 
national governments were quick to grasp. For calculating this indicator, each 
task whatever its working-time and its quality is counted for one, even if it 
represents only a few hours a week; thus it is much more effective and less 
costly, in terms of this score, to create part-time and precarious jobs than to 
create high-quality full-time employment.  
Moreover, this governance, by stating in advance about what and on what 
basis there can be discussion, induces a strategy that implicates social and 
economic actors and civil society in a process in which they have no mastery of 
either the issues or the relevant data. Such a self-referential involvement cuts 
them off from their activist base and leads them to, in fact, shirk their responsi-
bility, which is to build a representation of the claims of their mandators, and to 
fight for them. In the end this co-optation aims to transform them into relays of 
the Center. As a consequence of the cognitive hegemony appropriated by the 
Center, that which is not acknowledged by its procedures is no longer publicly 
visible, and thus does not contribute to collective decisions. 
These strategies of governance, by cognitive hegemony and implication, are 
developing at all levels; their point of departure is corporate managerial reform 
that combines the personal implication of employees and the quantitative eval-
uation of performance, inciting individualized employees to exploit themselves, 
and in that exploitation seek their personal achievement. 
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3.4  The Use of the Language of Economics in Politics 
Since the beginning of the European process, the discourse and political argu-
mentation of European authorities have employed the language of economics, 
and today of finance, not only for economic and financial matters, but also for 
other issues that on the face of it are far from these domains, for example the 
notion of “social investment” that has recently emerged (European Commis-
sion 2013). The documents on this subject seem to have been written by finan-
ciers and performance managers, and not by actors or specialists in social af-
fairs or representatives of civil society. The implicit objective is to identify the 
conditions in which such investment could be profitable, undoubtedly to gener-
ate yet another class of assets that could be traded on financial markets.  
This endows the European “novlangue” with a peculiar fragrance. This lan-
guage defines and uses concepts and notions in its own way. These definitions 
and uses are not those of ordinary language, nor those that have long been 
current in structured internal debate in their original fields, in economic, politi-
cal or social theory especially. I demonstrate this for several concepts in my 
book: competition, competitiveness, integration, harmonization, subsidiarity, 
federation. Research is needed in this area, combining several approaches, 
among them theories of argumentation. The terms of this “novlangue” have 
become autonomous through repeated use to attain political ends in negotiation 
and justification within the European sphere. Their political efficacy is due to 
the ambiguity of these shifts in meaning; they suggest and leave room for hope 
– misplaced – that the ends and results will correspond to aspirations: for ex-
ample the confusion between maximizing the employment rate and full em-
ployment, or between subsidiarity (that is based on the primacy of collective 
autonomy) and decentralization (a top-down approach). 
No domain of the economy is spared. However, the language of macroeco-
nomics turns out to be the right language for European governance. For, among 
other reasons, this language maintains a level of generality and abstraction such 
that the real issues, the concrete questions related to effective action in the 
field, are enveloped in a political discourse that validates a mild consensus and 
that escapes all democratic debate, keeping the discussion within the purview 
of specialists. Used as the Vulgate, this language helps make an end run around 
democratic practice. The Vulgate will always drown out and dilute the concrete 
details, the passage from the singular to the general case, in other words the 
need for democratic practice. 
4.  Towards A-Democracy  
The construction of Europe thus offers up not only to decision makers, but also 
to researchers, the elements of a political management system that could be 
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long-lasting, and could foster acceptance of the ongoing crisis of capitalism, or 
at least prevent the spread of systemic criticism. These elements are: loss of 
sovereignty in favor of a regional technocracy;6 centers of decision as far re-
moved as possible from the localities and people involved; key domains sanc-
tuarized, out of bounds for any debate; representatives (in the broadest sense) 
of collective interests implicated in self-referential procedures where the limits 
of what is to be known and decided are set in advance by the Center; dialogue 
rather than action; governance by quantitative performance indicators, con-
structing immediate equivalences with the general equivalent, money; instru-
mentalization of values; the disappearance of spaces affording breathing room, 
deliberation, autonomy; and others too many to enumerate. Each of these ele-
ments that may in itself appear to be harmless or an exaggeration, takes on 
another meaning when combined with the others, outlining an instrumentation 
of the forces of democracy at various levels, draining them of their critical 
efficacy and transforming them into tools for justification. All together, they 
reveal the movement that is underway towards a-democracy. This movement 
makes the construction of Europe a life-sized test of political forms. A very 
recent example can be found in the six European legislative packages adopted 
in 2012, and above all the two packages accepted by national governments but 
not yet ratified. These laws pose constraints on national collective choices, and 
in their way are forerunners of the control over States by the major market 
players that is anticipated under the Free Trade Agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and the United States if it is ratified. The EU legislation, using 
various techniques (reversed majority, dissuasive conditions for access to fi-
nancial aid) gives the Commission the latitude to impose economic and finan-
cial adjustment programs on the States that are a risk for the Euro zone, with a 
complex automatic pilot system of indicators and financial penalties. These 
measures would be applied before any democratic debate – for example by 
requesting that draft national budgets be submitted to the Commission in the 
first instance. At the same time, the proposal for an EU-United States free-trade 
agreement, negotiated in secret, intends to set up a private international arbitra-
tion system under which multinational corporations could bring suit against 
States and contest decisions or policies that the corporations deem contrary to 
their interests, with the possibility of obtaining the abrogation of the contested 
decisions and policies, accompanied by financial sanctions. Together, these two 
systems would bring about the end of all autonomy of choice on the part of 
human communities and would put them under the control of a globalized 
financial oligarchy in Europe.7 
                                                             
6  Regional referring to regions of the world. 
7  In its recent issue of 25 July 2014, the Süddeutsche Zeitung has revealed that, since 2009, 
the European Commission has been secretly discussing the same system of private arbitra-
tion for multinationals against national states in its negotiation of a project of free trade 
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Another example is relative to labor and social laws. They are of the main 
victims of the dual and in growing tension European system of rules, and of 
their drift towards a-democracy. It was not the product of the 2008 crisis, but a 
long term trend accelerated since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the con-
vergence process towards the Euro. 
As the priority of the European law was and is still to implement the single 
market (that is the neoliberal perfect market), labor and social laws have been 
progressively considered as obstacles to the total flexibility and instantaneous 
adjustment of the wages and the quantity of required work on labor markets. 
The autonomy of these fields (collective bargaining, place of the unions and 
their legitimate role, deliberative procedures of information and consultation of 
workers, collective works councils) was not contested at the beginning of the 
European process, at least at the national level. But it proved not impossible, 
but more and more difficult, to develop them at the European level, except for 
establishing minimum requirements for national laws. Since the 2000s, though 
there are exceptions, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, when facing a conflict between economic freedoms (the principle of 
free circulation) and social rights, even the basic ones recognized by the several 
European Charts, has decided in favor of the economic freedoms. Consequently 
economic and market law has taken precedence over the labor and social laws, 
penetrating their falsely believed protected and autonomous fields. Famous 
cases and judgments have been amply discussed in the literature (see the publi-
cations of Christian Joerges, for instance Joerges and Rödl 2008). 
The emergence of governance by numbers in the 2000s, using quantitative 
performance indicators as their target and reference of evaluation, has added 
macroeconomic and financial pressures for labor and social laws deregulation. 
Social expenditure has been counted for calculating national public deficits and 
for monitoring the process of convergence, through the 3% public deficit rule. 
And, as above reminded, the global rate of employment rate, whatever the type 
and quality of the jobs created, and its maximizing are along the main macro 
indicators followed by the European Commission and the ECB. They use them 
for benchmarking, for naming and shaming national policies and governments. 
Stronger pressures were placed on national governments to favor deregulation 
of their labor market and, in the crisis, to develop austerity policies.  
                                                                                                                                
agreement with the Canada, similar to the one negotiated with the US. Five years in the 
shadow! One has the feeling that the European Commission plays first in favor of the glob-
alized financial elite, and secondly, if at all, in favor of the Europeans. According to the 
newspaper, the German government has expressed its disagreement, rightly considering that 
such system will run against the States’ sovereignty, one of the foundations of international 
law. 
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The Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxemburg and the European 
Central Bank in Frankfurt are now the driving forces piloting the future of 
labor law in Europe, and no more public debate and democratic practices. 
Can we, as economists, ignore these facts and risks? What do we have to say 
and propose? There is much research and many experiments devoted to think-
ing about and nurturing modes of contestation, criticism, and new ways to build 
the economy and democracy in action. Let us focus in particular on the subject 
of democratic deliberation and its role in economic practice. Can we conceive 
of types of State that place democratic deliberation at the heart of political, 
economic, financial, social and environmental decision-making? 
5.  Democracy and Pathways to Revive the Universalist 
European Project 
In conclusion, let us recall that the European project espoused by its partisans 
between the two wars, and during and at the end of World War II, was a uni-
versalist political project. It was founded on democracy, peace, fundamental 
rights, and cooperation among peoples, and not on supranational integration. 
The vision was that each and all European countries would develop autono-
mously in the various spheres of the economy, politics, law, culture and socie-
ty, with mutual respect and cooperation, and also that in their own development 
they would be attentive to and foster the development of the others. And indeed 
some European achievements bear the hallmarks of this outlook, in culture, 
education, research and in the economy, for instance industrial achievements 
like Airbus (that Europe should seek to replicate in the energy sector).  
Was this, is this a utopian vision? Simple ideas, with great scope, were put 
forward.8 Major economists defended them; they only need to be revived in 
today’s context. These are possibilities which, if implemented, would allow a 
new start for the European project.9 I cite just one of these ideas that came from 
Keynes, on the organization of the world market order. Keynes developed this 
idea in his capacity as British negotiator of the Bretton Woods agreement.  
In the world order that prevailed and served as the basis of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) centered on the single currency, the debtor coun-
try is solely responsible for the return to equilibrium of the balance of pay-
ments. Keynes proposed another model of trade based on a universalist concep-
tion. Europe should adopt this model today. In the Keynesian system the 
creditor and debtor countries must cooperate to return their trade balance to 
                                                             
8  See Salais (2013), Conclusion, and the conference I delivered at the Council of Europe in 
January 2014, in the series about the identity of Europe (Salais 2014, to be published) 
9  Here I basically disagree with the radical pessimism of Wolfgang Streeck (2013a). 
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equilibrium, using various means: devaluation or revaluation in relation to a 
global accounting currency, Bancor; greater purchasing and investment by the 
creditor country in the debtor country, in order to reinforce its structural com-
petitiveness. If the imbalance worsens, both countries are subject to penalties. It 
should also be remembered that, in Keynes’ view, this system would go hand-in-
hand with control of speculative capital movements, if possible a control exer-
cised cooperatively among countries. Keynes had learned the lesson, rightly so, 
of the 1930s Depression that placed the onus of the return to equilibrium on the 
debtor country, drawing it into a spiral of austerity and depression that gradually 
dragged down the whole world (and as we see in the current crisis in Europe).  
Applying this idea of trade cooperation today would involve a revamping of 
EMU on the basis of strictly controlled movements of speculative capital in 
particular, granting freedom of circulation only to productive investment; on a 
system of shared responsibility for trade balances among creditor and debtor 
countries as imagined by Keynes; on a structure to manage cooperative invest-
ment among European countries that would aim to even out the trade balances 
between countries while stimulating their economies and productive capacity. 
Implementation of this notion would mean reforming European law and institu-
tions, to be based not on competition, but on the principle of cooperation. Who 
could fail to see that in this proposal the necessity of democracy is intimately 
connected to economic effectiveness and development? Cooperation to achieve 
balanced development between nations would create true equality between coun-
tries and mutually fruitful ties. It would foster the creation of democratic spaces 
for deliberation, and not for closet horse-trading between vested interests. 
References 
Dewey, John. 1927. The Public and its Problems. New York: Holt. 
Didry, Claude. 2002. Naissance de la convention collective. Débats juridiques et 
luttes sociales en France au début du 20ème siècle. Paris: Editions de l’EHESS. 
Dyson, Kenneth, and Kevin Featherstone. 1999. The Road to Maastricht: Negotiat-
ing Economic and Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
European Commission. 2013. Towards Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion. 
Brussels. Communication, COM 2013/083 final. 
Godino, Roger, and Fabien Verdier. 2014. Vers la fédération européenne, l’Europe 
de la dernière chance. Policy Paper 105, Notre Europe-Institut Jacques Delors, 
11 February. 
Joerges, Christian, and Florian Rödl. 2008. On the “Social Deficit” of the European 
Integration Project and its Perpetuation through the ECJ judgments in Viking and 
Laval. RECON On-line Working Paper 2008 (6). 
Lampedusa, Giuseppe Tomaso di. 1960. The Leopard. NewYork: Pantheon Books. 
Menéndez, Agustin José. 2007. Altiero Spinelli. From Ventotene to the European 
Constitution. ARENA Report 1/2007.  
Milward, Alan. 1992. The European Rescue of the Nation-State. London: Routledge. 
HSR 40 (2015) 1  │  199 
Paoda-Schioppa, Tommaso. 1998. Milan, Hannover, 1992. Review of Economic 
Conditions in Italy 3: 435-43. 
Salais, Robert. 2013. Le viol d’Europe. Enquête sur la disparition d’une idée. Paris: 
PUF. 
Salais, Robert. 2014. European Identity: the Past waiting for a Future. In Council of 
Europe (with the Ecole Nationale d’Administration), 2014. Debates on European 
Identity 2013-2014, ch. 7 <www.coe.int/t/policy-planning/Debates/Identity_ 
Debates>. 
Streeck, Wolfgang. 2013a. Vom DM-Nationalismus zum Euro-Patriotismus? Eine 
Replik auf Jürgen Habermas. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 9: 
75-92. 
Streeck, Wolfgang. 2013b. Gekaufte Zeit: Die vertagte Krise den demokratischen 
Kapitalismus. Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
 
